I am currently undertaking an explanation of the 45 Planks of Communism listed in the 1958 book The Naked Communist, which was unleashed upon an unsuspecting public many years ago to fulfill the strategic aims of global communism. Such an aim seems remote to a society addicted to sports, visual entertainment like pornography, flashy music, and gossipy story lines—but little do they know that all such devices were used as a means to destroy them philosophically. It was discovered at the start of the 20th Century that more than luck and favor of the Gods led to a successful life, it had more to do with the psychology of the mind—which is driven by the philosophy that a mind holds—so the way to destroy a human being was to destroy their philosophy. The way to destroy a collective society is not with guns, tanks, or massive troop deployments—as several world wars have proven—but to destroy their general social philosophy. During the Cold War Russian communists not able to compete economically against America, and knowing that they would eventually lose that race set out to perform an all-out assault against America’s philosophy of capitalism and individual freedom for their own preservation. That race ran out on them by 1989 when Communist Russia collapsed economically upon itself. Yet their long burning policies enacted many years earlier had already interrupted American culture taking much longer than planned by KGB agents exclusively because of the efforts by President Ronald Reagan who was the last president in American history to stand vocally, and principally opposed to communism. (Other American presidents opposed vocally communism, but principally supported progressive causes of statism)
Communists knew they had to solve a critical problem in 1958. Communism did not produce the same kind of economic power that capitalism did so the only way they could expect to hold their own on the world stage was to create Plank 4 on their list of 45 communist goals in that book of destitution released by Cleon Skousen.
4. Permit free trade between all nations regardless of Communist affiliation and regardless of whether or not items could be used for war.
By encouraging free trade with communist nations, using the United States funded United Nations as the platform to achieve the task, communists were able to hide their production problems from the world, and even their own people. Collectivization in the Soviet Union was enforced under Stalin between 1928 and 1940. The goal of this policy was to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms: mainly kolkhozy and sovkhozy. The Soviet leadership was confident that the replacement of individual peasant farms by collective ones would immediately increase the food supply for urban population, the supply of raw materials for processing industry, and agricultural exports. Collectivization was thus regarded as the solution to the crisis of agricultural distribution (mainly in grain deliveries) that had developed since 1927. This problem became more acute as the Soviet Union pressed ahead with its ambitious industrialization program.
In the early 1930s over 91% of agricultural land was “collectivized” as rural households entered collective farms with their land, livestock, and other assets. The sweeping collectivization often involved tremendous human and social costs.
After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, peasants gained control of about half of the land they had previously cultivated, and began to ask for the redistribution of all land. The Stolypin agricultural reforms between 1905 and 1914 gave incentives for the creation of large farms, but these ended during World War I. The Russian Provisional Government accomplished little during the difficult World War I months, though Russian leaders continued to promise redistribution. Peasants began to turn against the Provisional Government and organized themselves into land committees, which together with the traditional peasant communes became a powerful force of opposition. When Vladimir Leninreturned to Russia on April 3, 1917, he promised the people “Peace and Land,” the latter appearing as a promise to the peasants for the redistribution of confiscated land.
During the period of war communism, however, the policy of Prodrazvyorstka meant peasantry were obligated to surrender the surpluses of almost any kind of agricultural produce for a fixed price. When the Russian Civil War ended, the economy changed with the New Economic Policy (NEP) and specifically, the policy of prodnalog or “food tax.” This new policy was designed to re-build morale among embittered farmers, and lead to increased production, while as a progressive tax, those with more money paid more.
Until this time, the Bolsheviks allowed the peasants to take the land and farm it privately. In the 1920s, however, they began to lean toward the idea of collective agriculture. Memories of World War I were that soldiers from the Green cadres (Yugoslavia) maintained ties with the Red Guards (Russia) and helped them with food, sugar, tea, tobacco, etc. and they transferred their experience with the organization of agricultural cooperatives of the former Military Frontier, when the Red Army began to conquer Tomsk in Siberia. The pre-existing communes, which periodically redistributed land, did little to encourage improvement in technique, and formed a source of power beyond the control of the Soviet government. Although the income gap between wealthy and poor farmers did grow under the NEP, it remained quite small, but the Bolsheviks began to take aim at the wealthy kulaks. Clearly identifying this group was difficult, though, since only about 1% of the peasantry employed labourers (the basic Marxist definition of a capitalist), and 82% of the country’s population were peasants.
The equal land shares among the peasants gave rise to food shortages in the cities. Although grain had nearly returned to pre-war production levels, the large estates who had produced it for urban markets had been divided up. Not interested in acquiring money to purchase overpriced goods, the peasants chose to eat their produce rather than sell it, so city dwellers only saw half the grain that had been available before the war. Before the revolution, peasants controlled only 2,100,000 km² divided into 16 million holdings, producing 50% of the food grown in Russia and consuming 60% of total food production. After the revolution, the peasants controlled 3,140,000 km² divided into 25 million holdings, producing 85% of the food, but consuming 80% of what they grew (meaning that they ate 68% of the total).
The Soviet Communist Party had never been happy with private agriculture and saw collectivization as the best remedy for the problem. Lenin claimed “Small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, with elemental force, and in vast proportions.” Apart from ideological goals, Joseph Stalin also wished to embark on a program of rapid heavy industrialization which required larger surpluses to be extracted from the agricultural sector in order to feed a growing industrial work force and to pay for imports of machinery (by exporting grain). Social and ideological goals would also be served though mobilization of the peasants in a co-operative economic enterprise which would produce higher returns for the State and could serve a secondary purpose of providing social services to the people.
Most historians agree that the disruption caused by collectivization and the resistance of the peasants significantly contributed to the Great Famine of 1932–1933, especially in Ukraine, a region famous for its rich soil (chernozem). This particular period is called “Holodomor” in Ukrainian. During the similar famines of 1921–1923, numerous campaigns – inside the country, as well as internationally – were held to raise money and food in support of the population of the affected regions. Nothing similar was done during the drought of 1932–1933, mainly because the information about the disaster was suppressed by Stalin. Stalin also undertook a purge of the Ukrainian communists and intelligentsia, with devastating long-term effects on the area. Many Ukrainian villages were blacklisted and penalized by government decree for perceived sabotage of food supplies. Moreover, migration of population from the affected areas was restricted.
About 40 million people were affected by the food shortages including areas near Moscow where mortality rates increased by 50%.The center of the famine, however, was Ukraine and surrounding regions, including the Don, the Kuban, the Northern Caucasus and Kazakhstan where the toll was one million dead. The countryside was affected more than cities, but 120,000 died in Kharkiv, 40,000 in Krasnodar and 20,000 in Stavropol.
The declassified Soviet archives show that there were 1.54 million officially registered deaths in Ukraine from famine. Alec Nove claims that registration of deaths largely ceased in many areas during the famine. However, it’s been pointed out that the registered deaths in the archives were substantially revised by the demographics officials. The older version of the data showed 600,000 fewer deaths in Ukraine than the current, revised statistics. In The Black Book of Communism, the authors claim the number of dead was at least 4 million, and characterize the Great Famine as “a genocide of the Ukrainian people”.
Due to high government production quotas peasants received, as a rule, less for their labor than they did before collectivization, and some refused to work. Merle Fainsod estimated that, in 1952, collective farm earnings were only one-fourth of the cash income from private plots on Soviet collective farms. In many cases, the immediate effect of collectivization was to reduce output and cut the number of livestock in half. The subsequent recovery of the agricultural production was also impeded by the losses suffered by the Soviet Union during World War II and the severe drought of 1946. However the largest loss of livestock was caused by collectivization for all animals except pigs. The numbers of cows in the USSR fell from 33.2 million in 1928 to 27.8 million in 1941 and to 24.6 million in 1950. The number of pigs fell from 27.7 million in 1928 to 27.5 million in 1941 and then to 22.2 million in 1950. The number of sheep fell from 114.6 million in 1928 to 91.6 million in 1941 and to 93.6 million in 1950. The number of horses fell from 36.1 million in 1928 to 21.0 million in 1941 and to 12.7 million in 1950. Only by the late 1950s did Soviet farm animal stocks begin to approach 1928 levels.
Despite the initial plans, collectivization, accompanied by the bad harvest of 1932–1933, did not live up to expectations. Between 1929 and 1932 there was a massive fall in agricultural production resulting in famine in the countryside. Stalin and the CPSU blamed the prosperous peasants, referred to as ‘kulaks‘ (Russian: fist), who were organizing resistance to collectivization. Allegedly, many kulaks had been hoarding grain in order to speculate on higher prices, thereby sabotaging grain collection. Stalin resolved to eliminate them as a class.
The Soviet government responded to these acts by cutting off food rations to peasants and areas where there was opposition to collectivization, especially in Ukraine. Many peasant families were forcibly resettled in Siberia and Kazakhstan into exile settlements, and most of them died on the way. Estimates suggest that about a million so-called ‘kulak’ families, or perhaps some 5 million people, were sent to forced labor camps.
On August 7, 1932, the Decree about the Protection of Socialist Property proclaimed that the punishment for theft of kolkhoz or cooperative property was the death sentence, which “under extenuating circumstances” could be replaced by at least ten years of incarceration. With what some called the Law of Spikelets (“Закон о колосках”), peasants (including children) who hand-collected or gleaned grain in the collective fields after the harvest were arrested for damaging the state grain production. Martin Amis writes in Koba the Dreadthat 125,000 sentences were passed for this particular offense in the bad harvest period from August 1932 to December 1933.
The deaths from starvation or disease directly caused by collectivization have been estimated as between 4 and 10 million. According to official Soviet figures, some 24 million peasants disappeared from rural areas but only 12.6 million moved to state jobs. The implication is that the total death toll (both direct and indirect) for Stalin’s collectivization program was on the order of 12 million people.
It is said that in 1945, Joseph Stalin confided to Winston Churchill at Yalta that 10 million people died in the course of collectivization. However this allegation has been criticized by historian Michael Parenti. At Yalta, Churchill asked Stalin about the famine in the USSR to which Stalin responded by raising his hands, gesturing an unwillingness to speak about the subject, which Churchill, counting the Soviet leader’s fingers, interpreted as Stalin confessing a death-toll of 10 million people.
American farming unlike Russia and China did not have such statist restrictions, and food was produced relatively easily, and cheaply under the capitalist system of The United States. Even though the landmasses of both Russia and China are much greater than The United States, per acre, America produces much more food. Knowing this, communists had to find a way to hide their inefficiencies and stop the peasant uprisings that occur under communist’s systems after years of continuous failure, so they implemented Plank Number 4, which encouraged global trade without restriction of political ideology. This allowed communists to appear efficient to the people of their countries while implementing the global attempt of wealth redistribution. Over time, it has become expected that America has a responsibility to feed the world, as the Washington Post article below indicates at the link.
The suggestion is that regardless of what a country’s political philosophy may be, whether or not it is communist, socialist, authoritarian, or capitalist that the needs of the many out-weight the needs of the few, and that if there are a lot of hungry people in a communist country, the world—namely America—owes them the worth of their labor. The suggestion by communists in Plank Number 4 is that communist countries are entitled to the welfare of the world in spite of their failed political philosophy because they exist. This allows communist governments to maintain their failure without inciting their people into riot, which was the point of their strategy. The communist countries can then drain the wealth of capitalist nations destroying their enemy while using their enemies’ effort to feed their own starving people—which is indicative to all collective societies.
The result is in the expectation that America should feed the world at our expense allowing socialist countries and communist countries to pretend their economies, and philosophies are equal to The United States through wealth redistribution. The communist does not care what creates wealth; they only seek to destroy it for the aims of communism. Once the world has been emptied of its wealth, it can then be remade into the communist state under one world-wide rule—which was always the intention.
These are the reasons for Communist Plank # 4 and its implementation into American culture.